Table of Contents

CP 1

Competition 1

Solvency Core 1

NB 1

2NR FLs 1

Substance 1

Theory 1

# CP

A. CP Text: Developing countries should prioritize resource extraction over environmental protection when the two are in conflict and directly distribute the revenue from resource extraction to their citizens. Diamond and Mosbacher[[1]](#footnote-1) ’13

Given that reality, it is time to try a new policy approach, one that could drastically alter these incentives: the **direct distribution of** a portion of oil **revenues to citizens as taxable income**. In practical terms, this scheme **would work** as follows: **When a government received revenue from oil and gas exports**, **a** certain **predetermined proportion of it** (ideally, at least 50 percent) **would immediately be distributed** directly **to the bank accounts of the country’s citizens**. Then, **the government would treat those** distributed **revenues as income and tax some** of it **back**. **Each** **country could adjust the rate of taxation to transfer only that amount of cash** that **economists determined could be absorbed by the average poor family without fueling inflation or distorting incentives**. **This** oil-to-cash **system should not be** **confused with those of oil-rich Arab states**, such as Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, that lavish on their citizens payments and cradle-to-grave services. These programs lack two key features. **First**, **the money goes to the state and only then is distributed** (often at its discretion), **as** financial **payments**, social **services**, increases in **public salaries**, and so on. **Second**, **citizens** in these countries **do not pay** any **income tax**, **so** the crucial bond of **accountability never materializes.** Instead of increasing citizen participation and strengthening accountability, **state-to-citizen distributions** in these countries simply **use** oil **revenues to keep** the **people satiated** while further entrenching the power of elites. In doing so, these payments serve to increase citizens’ dependence on the state, rather than increasing their ownership of it.

The CP transfers revenues from resource extraction directly to citizens- also means his evidence is non responsive- that’s a different model which is worse- two warrants in my evidence.

O/V- Prefer Evidence:

1. Only my authors are comparative

2. Neg indicts are of existent models that are conceptually different

B. Competition:

1. Mutually exclusive – the counterplan is a direct instance of prioritizing resource extraction

2. Net benefits- turns and disads to the aff are reasons why the alt alone is preferable

3. Severance and intrinsicness are voting issues, they explode aff ground by granting the 1AR access to an infinite number of policy options and kill stable advocacy by letting the aff kick out of all links to disadvantages. Ground is key to fairness because equal access to offense determines access to the ballot. Stable advocacy is key to fairness because I can’t engage his arguments if he keeps changing them. Fairness is a voter- it’s constitutive of any competitive activity and drop the debater- the only way to compensate from the time skew of devastating short arguments is a loss.

## Solvency Core

### Resource Curse

CP solves the resource curse better than the aff- creates accountability and a tax base for economic stability. Diamond and Mosbacher 2

**The oil-to-cash approach** has been engineered by a team of scholars at the Center for Global Development (including Nancy Birdsall, Alan Gelb, Alexandra Gillies, Moss, and Arvind Subramanian) who contend that it **would attack the** fundamental **causes of the resource curse**. **Directly distributing** oil **revenues** as taxable income **would create a broad** and active **constituency of citizens** who were **directly affected by** the **government’**s **management** of their resources, **in place** **of** **the** often passive **populations of corrupt**, resource-cursed **states**. In a single step, **it would build a** broad **domestic tax base** -- a fundamental piece of any modern, well-governed state. Moreover, immediately **taxing** the **income** through explicit deductions from the transfers **would make citizens aware of the fiscal relationship**, **strengthening** the ties of **accountability** between the officials who control the state and the people whose money they are spending. Citizens would come to realize that it is indeed their money that the state is spending.

O/W

A. I create a rational incentive for citizens to care about the state in the first place- all of her evidence is in the context of disinterested citizens and noncaring policymakers- the CP generates a constituency, including indigenous people

B. Targets the most marginalized in society- a broad stroke program like a total ban on drilling still leaves the indigenous people with no livelihood and future- the aff can’t solve for residual harms of extracting so the CP is always net preferable because it reforms the process

C. Probability- banking and identification structures already exist- that means the CP’s mechanism is more likely to solve because a total ban is completely unheard of- the aff can’t control confounding variables and factors. Diamond 2

To many, the concept of **direct cash transfers** of oil dollars **seems** like a well-intentioned but utterly **infeasible** option. For starters, one might ask, how can **[many] countries** that lack **[already have] modern banking sectors or** even **national identification systems** be expected to implement cash-transfer programs? The answer is that many already have. As Moss has written, as of 2009, some **60 developing countries**, including Botswana, Brazil, India, Mexico, and Panama, **have made regular direct transfer payments to** approximately **170 million people**. That **success** **owes** **to** recent advancements in affordable and reliable **personal-identification technologies** that use biometric identifiers such as fingerprints and facial and retinal recognition. Gelb estimates that as many as **450 million people in developing countries have had** their **biometric data cataloged**. Although governments will need to invest in systems that allow them to properly and transparently transfer money into citizens’ accounts, **new technology in** the area of **electronic banking** **is making** **[transferring money]** this process **continuously** **cheaper** and more logistically feasible. Africa has experienced explosive growth in cell-phone subscriptions, now estimated at over 800 million, which, even allowing for users with multiple devices, means that the majority of Africans now have access to cell phones. Moreover, mobile-banking platforms, such as Kenya’s M-Pesa, are proliferating.

Direct distribution jump starts private economy and political stability- three warrants. Sandbu[[2]](#footnote-2) ‘12

Post-conflict environments are characterized by three principal needs: to invest in infrastructure destroyed by violent conflict; to prevent civilians from becoming disillusioned by peace; and to channel the demands of former belligerents in the direction of political competition and cooperation, in order to protect against the temptation of returning to arms. How can direct distribution contribute to these needs?One factor often underlying the resource curse is the state’s inability to invest without waste or corruption; this difficulty is likely to be at least as severe—if not worse—in a post-conflict situation, where crucial human and organizational capacity may have been lost, and time may be needed to reestablish effective checks and balances. As is discussed later in the chapter, **[first] direct distribution** may tamp down the forces that fuel waste and corruption in resource-rich states, and strengthen the incentives for post-conflict leaders to act in ways that benefit the population at large. But the most immediate significance of direct distribution in a post-conflict setting is this: by putting cash in the hands of the population, it **fosters an immediate** surge of **investment in private goods**, with no need to wait for state capacity to improve sufficiently to provide public goods. In particular, **cash payments** can **enable** even **the poor to invest by constructing** or purchasing **homes**, **and** **can** also **finance** the **inputs** **needed** **for** small-scale **production**. More generally, the **payments** can **kick-start a private economy that can meet the** material **needs of individuals** even **if public investment is lagging**. **[second] To prevent** post-conflict frustration from growing into deeper grievances that can foster **a return to violence, the population must experience the end of conflict as something that benefits them.** Philippe Le Billon argues that **direct revenue allocation** **provides tangible evidence of a “peace dividend”** for the population. Recent studies show that direct cash payments contribute posi- tively to poverty alleviation and disaster recovery, including in conflict-affected environments (2008, 9).Finally, **[third] direct distribution** may **give[s] policy makers**—who are likely to be excombatants—more **constructive incentives** than they would otherwise have. Sandbu (2006) argues that **by redefining** the **claims of citizens in relation to the state** and bringing transparency to the extent and value of the nation’s natural resources, **direct distribution can affect the way the social contract is perceived**. If this is the case, then **the policy** may **subject post-conflict rulers to greater public scrutiny**, **forcing them to pay** more **attention to** what they provide to **the population**—rather than to, say, personal enrichment or the pursuit of wartime grudges. This is particularly important when a conflict has been fought over control of resources, either as a prize or as a source of support for violence.8

O/W

A. Indigenous people are locked out of access to public investment and the public sphere- direct payment puts money in their pockets that gives the freedom to spend and invest in their own communities, which has the strongest link to change

B. Turns conflict scenarios in the aff- dividends prove policies that resolve tensions between drilling companies and local communities are tangible and offer substantive benefits- that’s vital to ensuring they stay enacted and that they’re complied with

### Conflict

CP solves internal conflict between regional and ethnic groups- three warrants. Sandbu 2

The most intriguing outcome for the incentive effects of direct distribution is the possibility of altering the politics of regional or ethnic conflict. If  **[first] a conflict** was **fought between regionally or ethnically defined groups**, the end of the conflict **may cover** a still-simmering **resentment**; if one group has defeated the other, victory may be taken as a license for abuse or discrimination. **By creating a symbol of unity**, a **universal resource dividend[s]** can **redirect political focus away from** the **fragmentation** of the past **and toward a unified future.** Le Billon, for example, suggests that if “the choice is made to distribute the revenue equally across the entire population, this can contribute to a sense of national identity and common destiny” (2008, 9).\There is a **second** reason that direct distribution could defuse **regional or ethnic tensions**: although such resentments may be genuine, they **are often manipulated by elites**, **who take advantage of grievances** that are ultimately **rooted in poverty, marginalization, and corruption**. Poor people who live in a resource- producing region can easily be persuaded that other parts of the country are stealing “their” resources. For example, although the states that make up the Niger Delta should theoretically be flush with cash because of a derivation formula that allocates an extra 13 percent of national oil revenues to producing states (beyond what all states get from revenue sharing between central and state governments), much of this money has been wasted or stolen. Never- theless, Niger Delta insurgents continue to demand even more revenue from “their” oil. **[third] One** possible **response** to such misdirected grievances **is to fully distribute resource rents**, **then render them taxable** not only a**t the central** but also at the **[and] regional** **level**, in order to focus on the political relationship between regional governments and the population of each region (Sandbu 2006). The idea is that **if the division of resources between private individuals and public authorities *within each region* becomes politically salient, people’s focus will shift to how** well **regional** (and local) **officials manage** whatever resource **revenue** the region disposes of, rather than on how much more the region could get if other regions got less. In a post-conflict situation, the hope would be that **attention can be shifted from** an earlier “frame,” which is focused on **the allocation of benefits to different regional or ethnic groups, to** a different frame, which is focused on **how those in power use common resources for the benefit of those without it**. As is discussed later in the chapter, current events in the Niger Delta may well shed light on whether this is a realistic possibility.

O/W

A. I solve the mindset that causes conflict over access to resources- oil and gas proceeds become a public good distributed via dividends which eliminates the need for groups to fight over control

B. controls the link to the root cause of disagreement- people fight in the first place because their grievances are rooted in socioeconomic factors that I directly ameliorate

CP solves economic causes of conflict- three warrants. Sandbu 3

The evidence that natural resource dependence retards economic growth is over- whelming.10 The exception is when resource booms occur within the context of strong governing institutions (Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik 2006), which is rarely the case. When disagreements are dealt with through violence, governing institu- tions are, by definition, failing. It also seems clear that drops in income increase the risk of conflict (Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti 2004). Insofar as **direct distribution can** remedy the negative effects of resource wealth on growth, it will also **blunt the** economic **causes of conflict**. There are **three reasons** why direct distribution schemes may do this: **[first]** *States are bad at allocating spending over time.* Despite the recent flurry of savings and stabilization funds, **resource-rich countries find it** extraordinarily **hard to smooth out** their **spending of** resource-derived **revenues**, which are **rendered** highly **volatile by fluctuating commodity prices** and eventual depletion.11 **Evidence from commodity booms** that have benefited households and businesses, in contrast, **indicate** that **the private sector does a better job** of managing windfall revenues than the public sector: **households and busi- nesses save more, and** therefore **have larger buffers** with which **to smooth out consumption patterns** (Collier and Gunning 1999). Studies of cash distribution schemes in nonresource settings also suggest that, contrary to stereotype, **poor households are** **good stewards of unearned income**, some of **which they put toward investment goods** such as household animals; nor does unearned income make poor people less likely to work (Skoufias and McClafferty 2001; Gertler, Martinez, and Rubio 2005).**[second]** *At any one point in time, states are bad at allocating spending between different uses.* Even if the private and public sectors made equally poor spending choices over time, weak states would likely be less competent at efficiently allocating spending for any given period. Although poor countries are often in dire need of investment in public goods, in practical terms, **cor- ruption or simple incapacity** may **lead[s] to the waste of public funds** (Robinson and Torvik 2005). Thus, **public allocation of funds may be worse than** what could be achieved by **market allocation** of private funds—even accounting for the fact that some public goods would then be unavailable. (Of course, if the government does not have the wherewithal to supply public goods, they would not be available in any case.)12 **[third]** *Universal cash distribution is one of the most effective policies for alleviating poverty.* “Relative deprivation” accounts suggest that even if incomes *on average* are not so low as to increase the risk of conflict, **severe inequality** around a given average **can trigger conflict** (Gurr 1970). Widely **distributed cash payments are** by far **the quickest way of alleviating poverty and inequality**— and may even, in the long run, be as effective as targeted (means-tested) poverty alleviation schemes, which typically suffer from “take-up” problems: that is, many of those entitled to benefits do not make use of them (Atkinson 1995). As noted later in the chapter, **Alaska’s direct distribution scheme** pro- bably **accounts for the fact that during the** 199**0s**, **the state bucked the** national **trend toward increasing** income **inequality**.

### Political Corruption

CP solves political corruption- incentives rulers to change their policies and it empowers citizens- a risk of solvency to access the aff. Diamond and Mosbacher 3

But nine of the 12 future oil exporters are democracies, and therein lies the hope for these revenue-distribution systems. In these countries, competitive elections with uncertain outcomes determine who rules. In some of them, democracy may well expire in the fever of sudden riches. But in others, **a** broad **coalition** **of forces in civil society and politics** **could compel rulers to implement** some kind of **oil-to-cash** model, **or** else **vote into office** **an opposition party** that has pledged to do so. It is hard to imagine a more compelling opposition platform than the distribution of at least some share of natural resource revenues directly to the long-impoverished people who are the real legitimate owners of the country and its resources. Public opinion survey data from the research project Afrobarometer show that Africans are more aware of their rights and more demanding of democracy than social science theories have traditionally assumed about the poor in developing countries. Moreover, **African civil societies are becoming better organized** and more assertive, and **with** the **growth** **of** new **communications** technologies (including community FM radio stations), **a** **more** **vigorous** **public** **sphere** **is** **emerging**. Once **African publics** understand the possibilities of oil-to-cash programs, they **may seize on the idea**. At that point, **it will not be easy for elected leaders to insist** that **the state monopolize** these **revenues**, unless they rig elections and repress protests. **Desecrating democracy** to corner this wealth may be a tempting strategy, but it **is one with huge risks**, **including being toppled from power** and punished. Some democratically elected leaders could opt instead to become public (and international) heroes by embracing reform.Unfortunately, the prospects for preempting the oil curse are much worse in Africa’s authoritarian states, for they lack the political competition and civic pressure that could induce reform. But despite the dangers that go along with challenging autocrats, **public demands for reform may rise** as corruption and misrule deepen, **ultimately leading the regime to make meaningful concessions.** Such a scenario is not unthinkable, for example, in Uganda, where, after nearly three decades of Yoweri Museveni’s presidency, the signs of governance rot are spreading, and the public is noticing. **Embracing** at least a limited **oil-to-cash reform would burnish any autocrat’s tarnished legitimacy**. After all, if presidents and ruling parties gave some of the new wealth to the people, that would still leave quite a lot of state revenue for them to manage**. Even partial reform** would begin to **change the relationship between citizens and the state** and create a new incentive for the public to monitor its rulers’ handling of oil wealth.

CP solves weak governance- spills over to solve conflict- three warrants. Sandbu 4

It has been argued, on the basis of the political economy effects of the natural resource curse, that direct distribution policies offer a particularly promising cure (Sandbu 2006; Shaxson 2007). The simple version of this argument holds that **direct distribution can improve the** deleterious **effect of natural resource rents on governing institutions** through two mechanisms. The **first** mechanism is simple circumvention**: by leaving a smaller proportion of total resource rents in the hands of government officials, direct distribution reduces both** (1) **the damage** the **rents can do to the public sector and**(2) the **damage the public sector can do with the resources**. With less “free money” flowing through the government, the rewards of corruption are smaller—and the number of wasteful projects or patronage positions that can be financed are fewer.The **second** mechanism involves a more intricate claim about political psychology (Sandbu 2006). **Paying resource rents** to individuals **has a cognitive effect: it informs** individual **citizens of the** magnitude and **volatility of resource revenues**, both **by eliminating secrecy and** by **expressing numbers in an easy-to- grasp way**—that is, in per capita terms. **It** also **has a motivational effect:** **once** private **individuals receive *some***share of resource **rents, the question of *how much***they get **is opened to** political **debate**. **That** openness, in turn, **gives citizens an incentive to pressure officials** either **to do a better job** of **spending** the **money** that remains in the public sector, or to increase the share that is distributed. At the same time, putting **a** direct **distribution policy** on the table **gives politicians an incentive to draw citizens into the political process by offering** them **meaningful** and easy-to-grasp **choices between competing versions** of the policy. The incentives that affect private individuals and politicians are likely to be mutually reinforcing. Under one scheme that has been proposed for direct distribution, “natural wealth accounts,” all resource rents are distributed but are then taxed (Sandbu 2006). This approach would further strengthen the public’s incentive to hold rulers to account: psychologically, people are inclined to care much more about money they consider their own and then have to give up (such as taxes on a resource dividend) than about money they had never had the opportunity to consider theirs (such as resource rents funnelled directly into the public treasury).But all versions of **[third]** **direct distribution will increase pressure for govern- ment accountability**—which, in turn, is likely to increase the likelihood that the government will perform better than resource-rich states typically have, particu- larly in the realms of institutional development and ensuring that economic growth benefits the population. **This shift**, in turn, **should temper** both the **politico- institutional** and economic **causes of conflict**. Thus, in a post-conflict setting, **direct distribution** may **contribute[s] to peacebuilding by reducing** two risks— **disenchantment with peace and** a **reignition of the conflict**—and by helping citi- zens to see that peace works: that is, that those who are in power are producing benefits for them.

## Africa NB

I control uniqueness on the net benefit debate- put away your turns. Devarajan and Giuagle[[3]](#footnote-3) ‘11

As the [Natural Resource Charter](http://www.naturalresourcecharter.org/) holds its third annual workshop at the University Oxford, in the UK, this week, the combination of **rising commodity prices and falling costs of communication tech**nology **presents** [**Africa**](http://www.theguardian.com/world/africa) **with an** unprecedented **opportunity to reduce poverty and fight corruption** at the same time.**The continent is experiencing a commodity boom,** and the bonanza is **likely to continue –** prices are expected to stay high **until 2015 at least**. It may even get larger through new discoveries. **This causes a triple problem** for the region's governments.**First**, their **currencies are appreciating**, **which leaves** the **other sectors** of the economy – manufacturing, in particular – **unable to compete** with imports. **Second**, **the risk of environmental damage** associated with extracting natural resources **is growing**. And **third**, the **opportunities for corruption and waste are multiplying** – not just in the granting of exploration and exploitation permits, but also in the use of the revenues from resource extraction. Except for Botswana, the track record of Africa's mineral and hydrocarbon exporters is sobering.

CP solves political corruption and resource curse- empirical and causititve warrants, with academic consensus. Devarajan and Giuagle ‘11

While **Africa's** central banks are today better equipped to deal with currency appreciation, and its civil society more alert to environmental hazards, the **institutions that control graft are not strong**. They must be improved. However, this will take time. Is there **a shortcut** to better accountability in the management of natural resources? Yes, there **is: direct transfers of resource dividends to citizens.**Around **35 African countries already transfer cash directly to their poor** – through smartcards, debit cards, mobile phones, or in person. This is getting cheaper and safer. The **coverage of banking and mobile phone services is expanding rapidly. So is biometric identification** with mobile devices. Logistically, there is **nothing** that **prevents governments from transferring** a portion – or even all – of the **income from natural resources** directly to every citizen, not just the poor. This kind of direct dividend payment is not new – Alaska has been doing it since the early 1980s.Why would giving people a share of commodity revenues help avoid, let alone reduce, corruption? Because **if you know you are getting a portion of** the **oil revenues, you will** surely **be interested in the total amount** – not to mention in **[and]** **what the government does with its share**. **You will want to know** that **the company which** **explores**, exploits and exports your country's **oil is** competent and **transparent** – otherwise you lose money. You may not care about whether that company is public or private, as long as the best possible operator is in charge. **You will not support politicians who** **interfere** with the process. In brief, **you will hold government to account** more.Optimally, one would means-test the dividend transfers, ie one would give more to those who are poorer. But that could be an insurmountable political and practical road-block. **A** uniform and universal **transfer** – the same amount to every citizen – would still be progressive, because it **will help the poor more than** the **rich**. If governments were to give up a tenth of their resource revenues, the **typical dividend could amount to $100 per person** per year. That's peanuts if you're rich, but **a life-saver if you live on less than $2 a day**, as most Africans do. And since the transfer goes directly to the individual, it could give a boost to groups that are regularly discriminated against, especially women.As a possible additional benefit, **direct dividend transfers could help national unity**. **In countries where regional, ethnic** or religious **differences** **make** **it difficult to agree** on how **to share natural wealth** – a problem that is, sadly, common in Africa – **the idea that** **everyone gets at** least a **bit of the riches**, personally, individually, regardless of location, ethnicity or faith, just for being a citizen of the country, **may be a useful source of national identity.**But if the resource money goes straight to the people, how will governments pay for "public goods" such as vaccinations, primary schooling, or defence? There are two possibilities. One is **to transfer** all the **resource revenues to** the **citizens**, and **then tax them.** After all, this **is how resource-less economies pay for public spending** – and why their taxpayers are keen to monitor it. The other possibility is to transfer only a portion of the commodity revenues. Either way, **direct dividend payments could be funded by governments' cutting back on** the more **inefficient** and inequitable **transfers** that resource-rich countries already make **– like tax breaks**, **fuel subsidies**, and jobs in the civil-service – and which are regularly captured by the well connected and the wealthy. In other words, **dividend transfers and fiscal integrity** can go together. Finally, will these transfers weaken public institutions by bypassing them? **On the contrary, giving people a direct stake** in their country's riches **can** **buy time**, and goodwill, **for** the slow-but-necessary **construction of better governance institutions**.

# 2NR FLs

## Substance

### O/V

[INSERT ROUND SPECIFIC ARGS]

CP is always net preferable than the squo and the aff- tiebreaker is timeframe. Sandbu[[4]](#footnote-4) ‘12

The answer to these objections is that **the correct comparison is not between** the behavior of **an ideal government** **and** the behavior of **private individuals** or public officials under a direct distribution system, **but between direct distribution and business as usual**—that is, channeling resource revenues to the public treasury, despite the governance failures exhibited by most resource-rich countries. Using the appropriate comparison, there seems little reason to fear that the results of direct distribution would be any worse than those of the usual scenario. **So en- trenched are** the **criminality and corruption** that distort the public use of resource revenues **in** most **countries**—especially conflict-torn countries—**that even a widely** **flawed direct distribution system** (which is likely to be the case, at least in the early phases) **may** well **be an improvement**. As for concerns that the private sector will waste the resource dividends, as the next section will demonstrate, evidence suggests that the private sector, on the whole, does a better job of managing windfalls than the public sector.

### A2 Unfeasible

CP is feasible- 3 warrants. Sandbu[[5]](#footnote-5) ‘12

The objections to direct distribution come in three forms. The first concerns practical feasibility: universal cash distributions may seem unrealistic in poor (especially war-torn) societies. There are **three answers** to this objection: **[first]** **Direct distribution** need not be complicated: it **can be carried out through** simple **accounts** held **at rural post offices with check-cashing facilities**; **fraud can be** **prevented through the** same **techniques** that are **used to prevent double voting** in elections.14 Naturally, the system would still require a huge logistical effort, but one that should be possible to overcome in all but the worst situations. (The initial establishment of the system would of course require adequate resources, and would likely have to be contracted out to an inter- national organization—perhaps to a private company with logistics expertise.) **[second]** The **organizatio**n required **for direct distribution is complementary to other** **infrastructural needs** in post-conflict settings—such as a census, electoral rolls, and basic transportation and communication networks. Since **these needs have to be met in any case, the additional cost of** implementing direct distribution **is small.**  **[third]** The **take-up problem** referred to earlier **would** probably **be minimal**, as the **incentives for getting registered and obtaining** the allotted **cash would be huge**.

### A2 No Implementation

1. Fiat solves

2. Three cases where the CP could be enacted. Sandbu[[6]](#footnote-6) ‘12

A second category of objection is that even if direct distribution were fea- sible, it would be politically impossible to implement. If direct distribution will, in effect, force government to implement better policies than it otherwise would, why would political leaders want to establish a system that will reduce their room for maneuver or their ability to divert money for personal gain? This con- cern has been addressed in normal (nonconflict) situations with the following argument: although the problem is a serious one, it is important to acknowledge **[three]** **political circumstances** that **could encourage the adoption of direct distribution** (Sandbu 2006): **[first] A state with newly discovered natural resource wealth**, which has **not** **yet** been **trapped by the** political economy of the **resource curse. [second] The presence of political outsiders who can** **challenge** entrenched **elites** **and** who may **have an interest in** a **populist policy** (which direct distribution no doubt is) as a means of shoring up popular support. **[third]** **Moments of upheaval** (such as wars or other sources of regime change), which **present windows of opportunity during which institutional structure may be “up for grabs.”**

## Theory

Extension Ev:

1. [Larry Diamond](http://www.foreignaffairs.com/author/larry-diamond) and [Jack Mosbacher](http://www.foreignaffairs.com/author/jack-mosbacher), “Petroleum to the People:Africa’s Coming Resource Curse—and How to Avoid It”. Foreign Affairs, September October 2013. Quals: LARRY DIAMOND is a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, where he directs the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law. JACK MOSBACHER is a Research Associate at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139647/larry-diamond-and-jack-mosbacher/petroleum-to-the-people>. RP 1/3/14 [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Martin E. Sandbu, “Direct distribution of natural resource revenues as a policy for peacebuilding”. Originally in “High-Value Natural Resources and Peacebuilding”, edited by P. Lujala and S.A. Rustad, published online June 2012. Environmental Law Institute and United Nations Environment Programme. Quals: senior fellow at the Zicklin Center for Business Ethics Research, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. RP 2/1/14 [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. [Shanta Devarajan](http://www.theguardian.com/profile/shanta-devarajan) and Marcelo Giugale, “How Africa can extract big benefits for everyone from natural resources”. The Guardian, Wednesday 29 June 2011. Quals: Shanta Devarajan is chief economist of the World Bank's Africa region. Marcelo Giugale is director for economic policy and poverty reduction programmes for Africa at the World Bank.http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/jun/29/africa-extracting-benefits-from-natural-resources. RP 1/3/14 [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Martin E. Sandbu, “Direct distribution of natural resource revenues as a policy for peacebuilding”. Originally in “High-Value Natural Resources and Peacebuilding”, edited by P. Lujala and S.A. Rustad, published online June 2012. Environmental Law Institute and United Nations Environment Programme. Quals: senior fellow at the Zicklin Center for Business Ethics Research, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. RP 2/1/14 [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Martin E. Sandbu, “Direct distribution of natural resource revenues as a policy for peacebuilding”. Originally in “High-Value Natural Resources and Peacebuilding”, edited by P. Lujala and S.A. Rustad, published online June 2012. Environmental Law Institute and United Nations Environment Programme. Quals: senior fellow at the Zicklin Center for Business Ethics Research, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. RP 2/1/14 [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Martin E. Sandbu, “Direct distribution of natural resource revenues as a policy for peacebuilding”. Originally in “High-Value Natural Resources and Peacebuilding”, edited by P. Lujala and S.A. Rustad, published online June 2012. Environmental Law Institute and United Nations Environment Programme. Quals: senior fellow at the Zicklin Center for Business Ethics Research, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. RP 2/1/14 [↑](#footnote-ref-6)